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BUILDING TRUST IN A GUARANTEE FUND IN A CHALLENGING INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Difficult access to credit is a major obstacle to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) survival, 
especially in emerging countries, affecting their competitiveness. Lack of guarantees is a main reason why banks do not 
lend to MSMEs. Guarantee schemes provide partial credit guarantees, but often fail to win trust of banks and 
enterprises. This study analyzes the process of building trust between the Fundo Garantidor para Investimentos 
(Investment Guarantee Fund, FGI), created in 2009, and banks in Brazil. This trust was hampered by the failure of 
public guarantee funds created in the 1990’s. This created a challenging institutional environment to the new fund. The 
methodology employed was a case study, based on a qualitative approach with document analysis, semi-structured 
interviews and descriptive statistics. The analysis used models for building and repairing trust in inter-organizational 
relations and international benchmark for governance and effectiveness of guarantee schemes. The analysis showed that 
the FGI used other emerging countries and developed countries experience to construct adequate governance and 
succeeded in establishing trust with the banks. The results show that by 2017, 26 banks contract more than 32,000 
operations worth 1.9 billion dollars, with additionalities comparable to the international benchmark.   
 
Keywords: Inter-Organizational Trust; Credit Guarantee Schemes; Comparison of institutional Environments; 
Corporate Governance; Emerging Economies. 
 
 
 
 
 
CONSTRUINDO A CONFIANÇA DE UM FUNDO DE GARANTIA EM UM AMBIENTE INSTITUCIONAL 
DESAFIADOR 
 
RESUMO 
 
A dificuldade no acesso ao crédito é um obstáculo importante para a sobrevivência das micro, pequenas e médias 
empresas (MPMEs), especialmente nos países emergentes, o que afeta sua competitividade. A falta de garantias é um 
dos principais motivos pelos quais os bancos não emprestam às MPMEs. Os sistemas de garantia oferecem garantias 
parciais de crédito, mas muitas vezes falham em obter a confiança dos bancos e empresas. Este estudo analisa o 
processo de criação de confiança entre o Fundo Garantidor para Investimentos (FGI), criado em 2009 e os bancos no 
Brasil. Esta confiança foi dificultada pelo fracasso dos fundos de garantia pública criados na década de 1990. Isso criou 
um ambiente institucional desafiador para o novo fundo. A metodologia utilizada foi um estudo de caso, baseado em 
uma abordagem qualitativa com análise de documentos, entrevistas semiestruturadas e estatística descritiva. A análise 
utilizou modelos para construir e reparar a confiança em relações interorganizacionais e as melhores práticas 
(benchmark) internacional para governança e eficácia de sistemas de garantia. A análise demostrou que o FGI usou a 
experiência de outros países emergentes e de países desenvolvidos para construir uma governança adequada e 
conseguiu estabelecer uma relação de confiança com os bancos. Os resultados mostram que, até 2017, 26 bancos 
contrataram mais de 32 mil operações no valor de 1,9 bilhões de dólares, com adicionalidade comparável ao benchmark 
internacional. 
 
Palavras-chave: Confiança Interorganizacional, Sistemas de Garantia de Crédito; Comparação de Ambientes 
Institucionais; Governança Corporativa; Economias Emergentes. 
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CONSTRUYENDO LA CONFIANZA DE UN FONDO DE GARANTÍA EN UN MEDIO AMBIENTE 
INSTITUCIONAL DESAFIADOR 
 
 
RESUMEN 
 
La dificultad en el acceso al crédito es un obstáculo importante para la supervivencia de las micro, pequeñas y medianas 
empresas (MPME), especialmente en los países emergentes, lo que afecta su competitividad. La falta de garantías es 
uno de los principales motivos por los que los bancos no prestan a las MPME. Los sistemas de garantía ofrecen 
garantías parciales de crédito, pero a menudo fallan en obtener la confianza de los bancos y las empresas. Este estudio 
analiza el proceso de creación de confianza entre el Fondo de Garantía para Inversiones (FGI), creado en 2009 y los 
bancos en Brasil. Esta confianza se vio dificultada por el fracaso de los fondos de garantía pública creados en la década 
de 1990. Esto creó un ambiente institucional desafiante para el nuevo fondo. La metodología utilizada fue un estudio de 
caso, basado en un abordaje cualitativo con análisis de documentos, entrevistas semiestructuradas y estadística 
descriptiva. El análisis utilizó modelos para construir y reparar la confianza en las relaciones interorganizacionales y las 
mejores prácticas internacionales para la gobernanza y la eficacia de los sistemas de garantía. El análisis demuestra que 
el FGI utilizó la experiencia de otros países emergentes y de países desarrollados para construir una gobernanza 
adecuada y logró establecer una relación de confianza con los bancos. Los resultados muestran que, hasta 2017, 26 
bancos contrataron más de 32 mil operaciones por valor de 1.900 millones de dólares, con adicionalidad comparable al 
benchmark internacional. 
 
Palabras clave: Confianza Interorganizacional, Sistemas de Garantía de Crédito; Comparación de Ambientes 
Institucionales; Gobierno corporativo; Economías Emergentes. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Micro, Small and Medium-sized enterprises 
(MSMEs) has an important participation in Brazil’s 
economy. MSMEs represent 98.5% of the private 
enterprises, 54% of formal employment (17.1 million 
people) and account for 27% of the GDP (Sebrae, 
2017). In 2014, MSMEs with up to two years of 
existence had a mortality rate of 23.4% (Sebrae, 
2016). Lack of credit, especially due to insufficient 
collateral, is one of the main reasons why firms shut 
down operations (Sebrae and Fubra, 2004). 
Guarantee funds constitute a public policy instrument 
designed to overcome the lack of guarantees, 
providing SMEs with access to credit by covering 
part of banks’ credit risk in loans (Lopes et al, 2007).  
During the world economic crisis and the 
lending contraction to firms, the Brazilian 
government created in 2009, new private guarantee 
funds for SMEs. Fundo Garantidor para 
Investimentos (Investment Guarantee Fund) – FGI, 
managed by the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento 
Econômico e Social (Brazilian Development Bank) – 
BNDES was one of these funds. In April 2017, this 
fund had assets of R$ 909 million (USD 286 million), 
with a R$ 8,44 billion (USD 2,6 billion) guarantee-
granting potential (Bndes, 2017). 
A guarantee fund success depends on trust 
between participants; this is influenced by its 
governance structure and the institutional 
environment. This article analyzes the process 
involved in repairing banks’ trust in this type of 
guarantee, shaken by the failure of the FGPC – 
Fundo de Garantia para a Promoção da 
Competitividade (Guarantee Fund for the Promotion 
of Competitiveness) created in 1997 and also 
managed by the BNDES. To achieve this goal the 
article analyzes FGI’s governance structure and 
effectiveness using emerging and developed 
countries benchmark for guarantee funds and models 
of inter-organizational trust building and repair.      
This study is justified by the important role 
played by guarantee schemes to foster financial 
inclusion, competitiveness and the expansion of 
MSME’s participation in the economy. The analysis 
of the trust repair process may provide valuable 
insights to analyze other types of inter-organizational 
relationships, especially in environments 
characterized by institutional voids, economic change 
and turbulence, common in emerging countries.  
The article is structured in five sections; this 
introduction; a review of the literature on 
competitiveness, guarantee schemes, inter-
organizational trust building and repair; the 
methodology used, results analysis; discussion of 
results and final considerations, with 
recommendations for future research. 
 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
The review of the literature includes credit and 
its influence over Brazil competitiveness and 
institutional environment; credit guarantee schemes 
(CGS), including the role of the National 
Development Banks (NDBs) in the credit guarantee 
system; CGS ownership (public or private) and 
governance structure, motivation and performance 
indicators; and inter-organizational trust building and 
repair. 
 
Competitiveness and Institutional Environment 
 
Competitiveness indexes are often used to 
evaluate and compare countries institutional 
environments. According to Lall (2001), a 
competitiveness index should fulfill two conditions: 
(i) it must “confine itself to activities that involve 
competition” between countries, not dealing with 
productivity or growth; and (ii) it should evaluate 
“market failures that affect competitive ability, 
especially the evolution of dynamic comparative 
advantage”. 
World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness Index (GCI), proposed by Schwab 
and Sala-i-Martin (2017), comprises 12 pillars, with 
114 indicators, 80 from the executive survey and 34 
from other sources. These other indicators are 
concentrated on macroeconomic environment, health 
and primary education and technological readiness. 
Infrastructure, higher education and training and 
financial market indicators rely mainly on the survey.     
Lack of credit access is clearly a market 
failure. Many indicators from GCI can affect credit 
access and availability. Between these indicators is 
possible to identify items especially in 3 pillars: 
Institutions: irregular payments and bribes, judicial 
independence, efficiency of the legal framework in 
settling disputes, ethical behavior of firms, strength 
of auditing and report standards; Macroeconomic 
Environment: government budget balance, country 
credit rating; Financial market development: 
financing through local equity market, ease to access 
loans, venture capital availability, soundness of banks 
and legal rights index (Schwab, Sala-i-Martin, 2017). 
 
Credit Guarantee Schemes for MSMEs 
 
According to Beck and de la Torre (2007), the 
high costs of transactions and the intrinsic high-risk 
account for the reluctance of financial institutions to 
provide financing to MSMEs. To overcome these 
difficulties, many countries have created partial CGS 
(Beck et al, 2010). Beck et al (2008) reported that 
banks view CGS as the most common and effective 
program of government support for loans to MSMEs, 
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ahead of directed credit and the use of interest rates 
of regulatory subsidies. 
According to Honohan (2010), it is common 
for governments to become involved in guarantee 
systems to compensate for market flaws and attain 
social well-being by attempting to minimize the 
effect of the adverse selection and moral hazard on 
the rates charged from SMEs. Governments attempt 
to correct the uneven distribution of credit allocation 
which, under normal circumstances, does not reach 
poorer areas. They also seek to explore the 
externalities of the dynamism of entrepreneurs who 
lack resources, increase loans to SMEs and avoid or 
minimize credit crunches. One of the arguments used 
is that banks do not provide loans directly to SMEs 
because they lack guarantees and do not realize the 
risk that they run. Guarantee systems break this 
vicious circle. In addition to the issue of well-being, 
other issues encourage governments to use credit 
systems: (i) their similarity to private risk sharing 
systems; (ii) optimistic pricing and separate 
accounting from the public budget, which minimizes 
fiscal costs; and (iii) little need for capital allocation 
as the systems have leverage. 
According to Beck et al. (2010), we can 
classify the systems in accordance with their 
ownership (public or private) and governance 
structure: credit guarantee companies, national public 
programs and private corporate associations.   
According to Lanz and Perufo (2013), partial 
credit guarantee schemes can be classified into three 
types: guarantee funds (GF), guarantee programs 
(GP) and mutual guarantee associations (MGA). 
Table 1 shows the characteristics of each guarantee 
scheme.  
 
Table 1 - Main characteristics of each guarantee scheme 
 
 
TYPE 
 
NATURE RESOURCES OPERATION LIQUIDITY 
Guarantee 
funds 
Public, private or 
mixed 
Public and private 
resources, seeking 
to be self-
sustaining 
Operational activities 
(analysis, concession and 
recovery) delegated to 
financial agents 
High (resources are 
available in the 
fund) 
Guarantee 
programs 
Public (operated by 
state agency or 
development bank) 
Resources limited 
by the public 
budget 
Own or delegated 
operational activities (but 
with subrogation) 
Low (subject to 
supervision and 
contingency of 
resources) 
Mutual 
guarantee 
associations 
Private 
Private resources 
from your 
associates 
Own operational 
activities: analysis, 
concession and recovery 
Average (limited by 
its regional scope) 
 
Source: Adapted by the authors based on Pombo and Herrero (2003), Zica e Martins (2008) and OECD (2010). 
 
According to Lanz and Tomei (2014) 
guarantee funds usually have greater liquidity, are 
more similar to private risk sharing systems, have 
more freedom to delegate operational activities to 
financial agents and seek to achieve financial 
sustainability. Guarantee funds have similar 
characteristics; however, they could be set up with 
different sources of resources, equity structures, 
governance structures, scope of coverage 
(beneficiaries types, limits), leverage and processes 
for claim and credit recovery. These characteristics 
usually are adapted to each country institutional and 
legal environment. 
 
CGS and institutional environment in Brazil 
 
According Chieza and Ambros (2006) a 
milestone in Brazil guarantee systems is the creation 
of public guarantee funds in 1996 as an alternative to 
improve SMEs credit access, providing guarantees to 
banks. However, the funds had limited scope of 
actuation because they were linked only to certain 
institutions operations as SEBRAE, with the 
Guarantee Fund of Small and Medium Enterprises 
[Fundo de Aval para Micro e Pequenas Empresas - 
FAMPE], BNDES with the Guarantee Fund for the 
Promotion of Competitiveness [Fundo de Garantia 
para Promoção da Competividade - FGPC] and 
Banco do Brasil, with the Guaranty Fund for 
Employment and Income Generation [Fundo de Aval 
para a Geração de Emprego e Renda - 
FUNPROGER]. Besides that, their structure, by its 
public nature, was closer to the guarantee program 
model, than a guarantee fund, as public budget 
dependent funds, with low liquidity. 
According to Lanz and Macedo (2014), since 
2009 guarantee funds have been structured in Brazil 
that seek to combine the best characteristics of 
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governance from existing models, such as being of a 
private nature with assets segregated from those of 
the shareholders and administrator, with no counter-
guarantees from the government, and seeking to be 
self-sustainable. 
 
National Development Banks and Guarantees 
 
NDBs managed guarantee schemes in many 
countries. According to Torres and Zeidan (2016) 
there is a life-cycle for the existence of development 
banks. It comprises four phases: establishment, 
development, engine for growth and developed 
financial markets. Each phase has typical 
instruments. the instruments for earmarking credit 
have two categories: direct, the NDB autonomously 
originate debt or equity; and indirect origination, 
NDBs create incentives to stimulate other financial 
intermediaries to originate loans related to 
government targeted investment projects, companies 
or industrial sectors. These incentives can be divided 
into provision of long-term funds; guarantees; 
equalization; and penalties. 
NDBs can provide guarantees for long term 
funds in either category: direct and indirect. The 
provision of guarantee to indirect operations or long-
term operations using resources from the financial 
agents is common. Sometimes banks operate these 
instruments directly, sometimes through funds or 
related companies (Torres, Zeidan, 2016). 
Guarantee support is consistent with Studart 
and Gallagher (2106) view of NDBs support to 
sustainable projects five fronts. Guarantee can help in 
project development and scaling up, leveraging 
finance, reduce the cost of capital to the borrower, 
crowding-in private capital, and improving 
governance and inclusiveness. 
 
Guarantee schemes effectiveness 
 
Guarantee schemes usually rely on public 
resources; therefore, it is important to verify the 
benefits of the system to society. According to 
Jonsson (2009), additionality is the main benefit and 
performance is evaluated based on the benefits for the 
three parties involved: the guarantor, the borrower 
and the lender.   
Additionality refers to the impact of the 
system on the borrower and whether he would have 
access to the credit under better conditions or if the 
guarantee implies the receipt of higher values. The 
measurement of the performance of a guarantee 
system expressed by additionality is technically 
challenging. According to Saadani et al (2011) 
different indicators are used for this evaluation,  like 
interviews with the SMEs beneficiaries to identity if 
the guarantee systems was determinant to credit 
access; use of descriptive statistics using other riskier 
borrowers as a proxy; propensity score matching 
(using control groups); regression discontinuity 
(control groups and credit scoring); randomized 
experiment (controlled rejections); natural and quasi-
natural experiment (alteration of eligible criteria, 
different banks, different periods of time and 
regions). According to Jonsson (2009), additionality 
can be labeled as financial and economic. Financial 
additionality indicates whether the SME would have 
access to financing in the absence of a guarantee. 
Economic additionality refers to the economic and 
social benefits, positive externalities such as the 
creation of jobs and expanded production. 
According to Green (2003), an evaluation of 
the system from the viewpoint of the guarantor seeks 
to ensure maximum additionality in the long term. 
The indicators evaluate the cost-effectiveness and 
sustainability relationship. According to Jonsson 
(2009), sustainability is measured by the capacity of 
the guarantor to cover his costs, either through 
charges, direct subsidy, donations or income from the 
investment of resources in the fund. The percentage 
of financing in the country for SMEs with guarantees 
is an indicator of the global impact of the system. The 
degree of leverage is considered an indicator of the 
successful exploitation of the stabilizing resources of 
guarantees. Another important indicator is the default 
rate. 
From the viewpoint of the borrower, the 
effectiveness of the system can be translated by 
indicators such as the number of loans and improved 
conditions, increased values and deadline and lower 
tax rates, reduced collateral and faster processing of 
loan applications (Jonsson, 2009; Green, 2003). 
For the lender, the performance indicators are 
linked to behavior in relation to SMEs and the rate of 
coverage requests. Lanz and Tomei (2013) identified 
other indicators, such as the period of time between 
the application and payment of coverage and the rate 
of rejected coverage requests linked to the conformity 
of operations with the rules of the guarantee system, 
which should seek simplicity and clarity. 
According to Lanz and Tomei (2014), the 
main benefits of this type of fund for the bank are the 
shared credit risk, the application of a favorable risk 
weighting factor to determine the regulatory capital 
required by the Central Bank, and the liquidity of 
collateral, which has no restraints on its trigger and 
depends only on default by the beneficiary, similar to 
a bank guarantee. 
 
Inter-Organizational Trust Building and Repair  
 
Trust is essential for the development of an 
effective relationship between organizations.  Based 
on Mayer et al (1995) and Zaheer et al (1998), trust is 
accepting to be vulnerable to another party, based on 
the expectation that this party will fulfill his 
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obligations, behave as expected, act and negotiate 
fairly, especially when an opportunity for 
opportunistic behavior appears. 
According to Handley and Benton (2013), one 
of the main concerns in the management of inter-
organizational relationships is the behavioral or 
relational uncertainty that arises due to the 
misalignment of goals or incentives between the 
parties. Establishing trustworthy relations minimize 
the impacts of uncertainty and relational risk. It is 
important to align the behavior of the companies with 
the interests of the alliance.  
High levels of interdependence create an 
environment that cultivates and perpetuates trust and 
commitment by making the costs of opportunistic 
behavior prohibitive for partners (Gulati, Sytch, 
2007). The possibility of monitoring to determine if 
there are deviations from the standard or rules and 
institutional structures (safeguards) that allow 
standards and rules to be re-established, even in a 
coercive way help to minimize opportunistic behavior 
(Das, Teng, 2001). 
According to Lewicki and Bunker (1995) 
repeated interaction and the creation of a relationship 
between parties create predictability, which is a 
source of trust. Becerra and Gupta (2003) identified 
that the frequency of communication has a similar 
role, the greater the frequency, the lower the 
receiver’s perception of dependence on the person 
responsible for communication aimed at establishing 
a relationship of trust and greater the trust. Gulati and 
Sytch (2007) identified that the quality of the 
exchange of information between partners, in terms 
of details, accuracy and timeliness, influence inter-
organizational performance.  
Faems et al. (2008) analyzed governance 
structures for inter-organizational relationships and 
identify two perspectives: structural and relational. 
The structural perspective focus analysis on single 
transactions, expects partners to behave 
opportunistically and use complex contracts to 
prevent this kind of behavior. This perspective is 
unsuited to long-term relations. The relational 
perspective, based on social exchange theory uses 
trust as a governance mechanism. 
Malhotra and Murnighan (2002) investigated 
the effect of contracts on interpersonal trust and 
found evidence that the use of binding contracts, i.e. 
that can be enforced by applying penalties and the 
force of law have negative impacts on trust building. 
Non-binding contracts, on the other hand, lead to 
cooperation between parties and provide a basis for 
trust building. 
Boehs and Segatto-Mendes (2007) identify 
some mechanisms used to create trust in joint 
ventures, such as establishing controls on entry 
(distribution of resources, information management) 
behavior (policies, rules, procedures, standardization) 
and exit (targets, budgets, results); socialization of 
values in order to define and create common values; 
personal involvement, in which the managers of 
partnerships pay visits, arrange meetings and make 
verbal communications; and the existence of specific 
hierarchical structures that emphasize and support 
partners. 
According to Sundarämurthy and Lewis 
(2003), the context is important in determining the 
prevalence of control or collaboration/trust in 
governance. In a context of low performance control 
tends to be reinforced and lead to decline, whereas in 
a high-performance environment trust is reinforced 
which tends to enhance performance.  The cycle of 
low performance can be broken with some measures: 
encourage trust in the abilities of others while 
recognizing cognitive limitations and conflicts so as 
to improve controls and build constructive debates; 
foster the diversity of ideas and heterogeneous 
backgrounds, in addition to creating shared 
understandings. 
Tomlinson and Mayer (2009) present 
proposals for repairing trust: demonstrate that the 
breakdown of trust or the negative result was caused 
by an external agent and not the internal agent’s 
inability or lack of benevolence or integrity. Repair is 
more effective if conflicts are reduced, diminishing 
anxiety and the fear that situations will repeat 
themselves, by apologizing, presenting justifications 
and demonstrating that the attributions of trust remain 
intact and that the new situation is stable. 
Mesquita (2007) affirms that the rebuilding of 
trust between firms may require the services of a 
facilitator who has a reputation for trustworthiness, 
recognized leadership, mediation and negotiation 
skills. The process has a greater chance of success 
when (a) it takes place inside legitimate institutional 
environments, (b) is aimed at specific groups and 
tasks and (c) the conflicts involved have more to do 
with business matters than personal antipathy.   
Gillespie and Dietz (2009) identify two 
components of trust repair interventions: curbing 
behaviors viewed as being untrustworthy and 
reinforcing/demonstrating trustworthy behaviors. 
According to the literature, trust is essential 
for inter-organizational relationships and develops in 
the presence of information exchange, 
communication, relational structures with non-
binding contracts and long-term orientation. When 
trust is broken is important to repair the relationship 
to improve performance, and to do so is important to 
apologize, justify actions taken, and diminish 
potential conflicts by reinforcing trustworthiness’ 
behavior. 
The next section explains the methodology 
used in this case study, how the literature and 
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international benchmark for guarantee schemes 
governance and effectiveness were applied to access 
FGI inter-organizational trust building.   
 
 
3 METHODOLOGY 
 
The methodology used combine a qualitative 
approach and use descriptive statistics, based on the 
mixed methods approach. proposed by Creswell 
(2013). This allows the triangulation of multiple 
sources of data and results from different methods, in 
order to overcome the limitations of each method 
alone, and contribute to theory. The FGI case study 
was performed with interviews and document 
analysis with fund manager team – the BNDES – in 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.  For data collection purposes, 
ten interviews were undertaken with managers of the 
fund at the BNDES in order to gauge their 
perceptions regarding the themes examined in the 
theoretical references, using the interview script 
outlined in Table 2, between 2013 and 2016.   
 
Table 2 - Interview Script 
 
QUESTION AIM OF THE QUESTION 
1. Did FGI used any national or international benchmark 
to set up its governance structure? Which one(s)? 
Identify national and international benchmarks 
used to set up governance. 
2. What kind of governance structure does the FGI 
have? What distinguishes it from the FGPC’s structure? 
Explain. 
Identify whether the structure uses the structural or 
relational perspective (Faems et al. 2008)  
3. How does the FGI behave towards the financial 
agents? How is the relationship between the parties? 
Identify managers’ behavior / relationship between 
FGI and financial agents (Lewicki and Bunker, 
1995): 
4. How would you define the FGI’s reputation? And the 
BNDES’s? What has been done to generate trust in this 
guarantee fund? 
Identify their view of the fund’s reputation 
(Tomlinson and Mayer, 2009). 
5. Describe the communication and information 
exchange process between the FGI and banks.  
Identify the communication process and openness 
degree between parties (Becerra and Gupta, 2003; 
Gulati and Sytch, 2007). 
6. How is contract fulfillment formalized and verified? 
Explain and give examples. 
Identify contract type: binding or non-binding 
(Malhotra and Murnighan, 2002).   
7. How does the FGI’s monitoring and control system 
work?  What are the main control mechanisms used?  
Identify what kind of controls the Fund uses 
(Boehs and Segatto-Mendes, 2007).  
8. How are conflicts between banks and the FGI 
resolved? Are their many conflicts? What type? 
Identify types and level of conflict (Mesquita, 
2007; Sundarämurthy and Lewis 2003). 
9. What are the main benefits provides by the Fund to 
the Financial Agents and to the SMEs? 
Identify the main benefits provided by the Fund 
(Lanz and Tomei, 2014; Jonsson, 2009, Green, 
2003). 
10. Describe the FGI’s performance in financial terms, 
number of customers (market share) and in terms of 
banks’ satisfaction? 
Identify performance perception (Faems et al. 
2008).   
 
Source(s): Prepared by the Authors based on Lanz and Tomei (2016). 
 
The subjects’ selection criteria were 
convenience and accessibility. Interviews were 
conducted face to face, recorded and transcripted. 
Content analysis was used to extract respondents’ 
perceptions about the topics covered. The managers 
interviewed have between 5 and 10 years of BNDES. 
Their academic formations are economists, business, 
accountants and lawyers. Table 3 shows respondents 
responsibilities. Confidential data and information 
protected by law about the FGI were omitted from 
the final report. 
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Table 3 - Interview Participants 
 
DIVISIONS 
 
RESPONDENTS 
 
ATTRIBUTIONS 
Department 
Chief 
1 interview Responsible for FGI and FGPC 
Product and 
Project 
3 interviews 
Development of new products. Adjustments to existing products 
and standards. 
Institutional 
Relationship 
2 interviews 
Institutional relations, new financial agents’ habilitation and 
training of financial agents 
Operations 2 interviews 
Operating activities: analyzing claims requests, processing 
payments, credit recovery and operations auditing. 
Legal 2 interviews 
Responsible for legal support to all divisions, contracts elaborations 
and fund “by-laws”. 
 
Source(s): Prepared by the Authors. 
 
Guarantee schemes structure and governance 
data collection relied on secondary data, especially 
information released by governments, multilateral 
institutions, development banks, guarantee funds, 
journals and theses about inequality and guarantee 
schemes for MSMEs. To evaluate the impact of the 
use of the FGI in terms of the feasibility of MSMEs 
gaining access to credit, several measurements were 
used to evaluate additionality, such as comparing 
success in gaining access to credit by companies with 
similar characteristics, with and without the 
guarantee of the FGI from the beginning of 
operations in 2010 until December 2016. 
The limitations of the study include the fact 
that only SMEs that had undergone a credit analysis 
by the banks authorized to conduct indirect 
operations with the BNDES were included, 
representing a subset of SMEs. Besides that, there is 
no data related to job generation or revenue increase 
for the firms analyzed, which prevent the study to 
evaluate social and economic additionality. However, 
firms in poorer regions of the country having access 
to credit, firms with higher risk and other indicators 
can be used as a proxy for this analysis. As this is a 
single case study with qualitative analysis and a 
limited set of operations for analysis, due to the 
possible bias in the selection of subjects, the results 
cannot be used to make statistical generalizations. 
Generalizations can only be made of the theoretical 
propositions (Yin, 2013). 
 
 
4 RESULTS 
 
Structure and governance analysis 
 
In order to identify the characteristics of 
guarantee schemes that could serve as models for FGI 
analysis, the experience of other countries was 
summarized in Table 4. The analysis demonstrates 
the national guarantee schemes usually are operated 
as public entity or have mixed control, between 
government and a public bank, the same occurs with 
the resources used (Mexico, Argentina and France). 
Guarantee coverage usually is above 50%. 
Governance structure usually have audits, 
shareholders and supervisory authorities, in some 
cases using banking rules, that is also the main 
criteria for leverage (Basel rules). Claims usually 
require proof of judicial execution and in most cases, 
are delegated to the financial agents. Beneficiaries 
typically are MSMEs, with investment and working 
capital purposes. Guarantees are operated by loan, 
but in some cases, there is portfolio, mezzanine and 
second floor guarantees. 
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Table 4 – Guarantee Schemes Characteristics from Selected Countries 
 
 
COUNTRY 
 
CHILE COLOMBIA MEXICO ARGENTINA FRANCE GERMANY AUSTRIA 
Fund / Entity 
Fondo de Garantía 
para Pequeños 
Empresários 
(FOGAPE) 
Fondo Nacional de 
Garantias (FNG) 
Nacional 
Financeira S. A. 
(Nafinsa) 
Fondo de Garantía 
para la Micro, Pequeña 
y Mediana Empresa 
(FOGAPyME) 
BPI - France / 
former OSEO 
(manages several 
funds) 
Verband Deutscher 
Bürgschafts-banken 
(VDB) 
Austria 
Wirtschaftservice 
(AWS) 
Type of entity Public 
Private (mixed 
economy) 
Public Public 
Private (mixed 
economy) 
Private (Registered 
association) 
Public (state owned) 
Resources 
Government 
contributions, 
guarantee fees, 
return over 
investments and 
claims recovery. 
Government 
contributions, 
guarantee fees, 
return over 
investments and 
claims recovery. 
Government 
contributions, 
guarantee fees, 
return over 
investments and 
claims recovery. 
Banco de la Nación 
Argentina, Secretaría 
de Hacienda and 
Banco de Inversión y 
Comercio Exterior 
Government 
contributions, 
guarantee fees, 
return over 
investments and 
claims recovery. 
17 guarantee banks. 
Counter-guarantee 
from Federal 
Republic of 
Germany and 
Federal States 
Government 
Equity 
structure 
Banco Estado is the 
only shareholder 
Government (Min. 
Hacienda, Min. 
Comercio), Banks 
and Funds 
(Bancóldex, 
Findeter) 
Mexican 
Government 
Argentinian 
Government 
French 
Government (50%) 
and Caisse des 
dépôts et 
consignations - 
CDC (50%) 
100% private. 
Legally and 
economically 
independent 
Guarantee Banks in 
each federal state 
(Bundesland) 
Limited Company – 
Financial Institution 
Management 
fee 
0.15% of the 
formalized 
guarantees and 10% 
of the profit for the 
year 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Administrative fees 
(Variable amount 
according to nominal 
amount of the 
guarantee 
commitment) 
N/A 
Governance 
structure 
Administrator, 
Audit, Banking 
Supervision and 
Ministry of Finance 
Administrators, 
Shareholders' 
Meeting, Audit, 
AMV, Banking 
Supervision, 
Controllership. 
Committees for 
Credit, Risk, 
Audit, Internal 
Control, Audit of 
the Federal 
Government 
Management 
committee composed 
of (state) shareholders. 
Government 
Bank (merger of 
OSEO with BPI). 
Bank. Specific 
banking license 
limited to guarantee 
activities 
Financial Institution 
 
Resources Fixed income fund, Fixed income Fixed income Fixed income Variable and fixed N/A N/A 
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management / 
application 
in financial 
instruments 
authorized by the 
Central Bank 
(government 
bonds) 
(bonds, bonus e 
certificates) 
(government bonds) income 
Scope of 
coverage 
Credit of the 
financial agents 
themselves. 
Credit of the 
financial agents 
themselves. 
Credit of the 
financial agents 
themselves. 
Credit of the financial 
agents themselves. 
Credit of the 
financial agents 
themselves. 
VDB covers the 
national level 
whereas each 
Guarantee Bank 
covers only its 
federal state 
National (Central 
Scheme only) 
Purpose of 
guarantee 
operations 
Investment and 
working capital 
Investment, 
working capital 
and revolving 
credit 
Investment and 
working capital. 
Investment and 
working capital. 
Second tier MGAs. 
Investment, 
working capital 
and start-ups 
Agriculture, 
Industry, Crafts, 
Retail, Liberal 
professions, 
Cooperatives 
All sectors (with the 
exception of 
Agriculture and 
Tourism) 
Beneficiaries 
MSME (Micro, 
small and medium 
enterprises) 
MSME and 
housing of social 
interest 
MSME, productive 
chains and 
microcredit. 
MSME MSME 
SMEs, Micro-
enterprises, 
Independent/Self-
employed 
Mainly SMEs 
Type of 
guarantee 
Operation/loan 
Operation/loan 
(limits by 
borrower, financial 
agent and credit 
line) 
Operation /loan. 
Portfolio, and first 
losses (reverse 
auction) 
Operation/loan. For 
MGAs by portfolio 
Operation/ loan.  
Mezzanine 
financing 
guarantees, 
Loan default 
guarantees, 
Mezzanine financing 
guarantees, Leasing 
guarantees and 
specialized programs 
for energy 
contracting and 
agriculture 
guarantees 
Loan default 
guarantees, Leasing 
guarantees, Working 
capital loan 
guarantees, Project 
guarantees and 
Mezzanine financing 
guarantees 
Guarantee 
Coverage / 
Limits by 
Beneficiary 
Up to 80% for Micro 
and small enterprises 
and export 
companies; 50% 
Mediums enterprises 
e 30% large 
enterprises 
Up to 50% 
Up to 85% for 
start-ups, e 70% 
for MSMEs. 
Up to 65% for 
MSMEs. Up to 40% 
for MGAs. Average 
coverage is 25% for 
MSMEs 
Up to 70%. Most 
cases below 50% 
Up to 90% (SMEs 
and stat-ups) 
€ 2 million 
Up to 80% to SMEs 
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Stop loss 
mechanism 
No No No 25% 
No, except new 
funds w/o credit 
history. 
No No 
Leverage limit 10 times 
Basel Rules (11% 
solvency index) 
Solvency margin Total guarantees Solvency margin 
Basel rules (solvency 
margin) 
Basel rules (solvency 
margin) 
Claim 
Proof of judicial 
execution 
Proof of 
extrajudicial or 
judicial execution 
Proof of 
extrajudicial or 
judicial execution 
Proof of extrajudicial 
execution 
After the 
conclusion of 
judicial execution 
N/A (each bank 
associated) 
N/A 
Credit 
recovery 
responsible 
Financial Agent 
Own and delegated 
to the Financial 
Agent 
Financial agent 
Financial agent or 
MGA. 
Financial Agent 
N/A (each bank 
associated) 
N/A 
Financial 
agents’ 
habilitation 
There is not. (Banks, 
factoring, 
cooperatives and 
guarantee 
associations). 
Simplified for 
financial system 
entities, complex 
for cooperatives, 
associations and 
foundations. 
Assessment of 
analysis, 
evaluation, 
monitoring and 
recovery policies. 
Contract of 
Qualification of the 
agent or MGA. 
Evaluation analysis 
and recovery of 
credit. 
Terms and 
conditions 
N/A 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors from the Ibero-American Forum of Guarantees, 2016; FNG, 2017, FOGAPYME, 2017, FOGAPE, 2017; NAFINSA, 2017; BPIFRANCE, 
2017. AECM, 2017. 
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The FGI structured is compatible with this 
benchmark and try to correct the deficiencies of the 
FGPC, which it replaced, as demonstrated in Table 5, 
constructed based on the analysis of the fund's by-laws, 
regulations and manuals. The comparison also relates 
the Fund’s characteristics with the items from the 
literature review and GCI when applicable.  
 
Table 5 – Characteristics of FGI – Fundo Garantidor para Investimentos versus FGPC - Fundo Garantidor para 
promoção da Competitividade 
 
Scope FGPC FGI 
 
Mechanism of trust building  
(Theoretical reference) 
 
Type of entity Public Private The FGI is a joint venture with 
interdependence between the parties (Gulati 
and Sytch, 2007) which promotes the 
alignment of participants' interests. This 
institutional setting mitigates opportunistic 
behavior and favors dispute settling. 
(Handley and Benton, 2013) 
Resources 
Public budget. 
Subject to budget 
constraints. 
ABGF, BNDES, financial 
agents. Segregated in fund. 
Equity 
Structure 
Federal Government 
as shareholder 
Public (ABGF and 
BNDES) and private 
shareholders (banks) 
Management 
fee (BNDES) 
N/A 
0.15% p.y. on managed 
funds + 1% p.y. On the 
total assets (contracting 
services directly paid by 
the IGF) 
Clear limitation of costs, consistent with the 
structural perspective of alliances and the 
theory of transaction costs (Faems et al., 
2008). 
Governance 
Structure 
Administrator and 
Audits 
Shareholders’ Assembly, 
Federal participation 
Council, Administrator e 
Audit, actuarial 
Consulting. 
The FGI has an institutional structure with 
greater possibility of monitoring. 
Ease of understanding the administration of 
resources and evolution of results. It strength 
the auditing and report processes. (Das and 
Teng, 2001) 
Resource 
Management / 
application 
Annual Federal 
budget 
Active with fixed and 
variable income, having as 
benchmark IRF-M and 
Ibovespa 
Scope of 
coverage 
Operations with 
BNDES resources 
Operations with BNDES 
resources and credit from 
financial institutions 
themselves 
Possibility of securing credit from the 
institutions themselves, with a long-term 
perspective and an expectation of expanding 
the relationship. (Lewicki and Bunker, 1995; 
Faems et al, 2008) 
Purpose of 
guarantee 
operations 
Investment, working 
capital e exports 
Investment, innovation and 
working capital 
Beneficiaries 
Micro and Small 
Enterprises, besides 
the Medium 
Exporting Companies 
or the Export Chain 
Micro, Small and Medium 
Enterprises; Self-employed 
Freight Carrier; Individual 
Microentrepreneur 
Type of 
guarantee 
By operation/loan 
Per transaction (linked to 
the stop loss rule in the 
Agent's portfolio); By 
portfolio; Indirect 
guarantee as a second floor 
to Credit Guarantee 
Companies and FIDCs. 
FGI has greater safeguards and limiters. 
The form of guarantee, limits and stop loss 
have the effect of generating greater 
confidence in limiting losses and concern 
with opportunism providing structural 
security (Gulati and Sytch, 2007; Das and 
Teng, 2001). 
Theory of transaction costs. (Faems et al, 
2008) 
 
Guarantee 
Coverage / 
Limits by 
Beneficiary 
Up to 80% 
From 20% to 80% of the 
loan. Guarantee limited to 
R$ 10 million 
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Stop loss 
mechanism 
N/A 7% each 5 years’ period 
Leverage limit 8 times the capital 12 times the capital 
Claims 
payment 
Subject to 
Government budget 
fiscal constraints. 
Default rate 
methodology based 
on debit balance 
On first demand. Default 
rate methodology based on 
the net loss of the portfolio 
((Honored - Recovered 
Value) / Guaranteed) 
Payment on first demand mitigates the 
inefficiency of Brazil legal system (Schwab 
and Sala-i-Martin, 2017). 
Credit 
recovery 
responsible 
Restriction restricted 
to rules or approval 
by the Board in each 
agreement. 
Pre-approved policy with 
recovery delegated to the 
Agent and subject to audit. 
Behavioral control (Boehs and Segatto-
Mendes, 2007). 
Financial 
agents’ 
habilitation / 
qualification 
Qualification linked 
only to the possibility 
of operating with 
BNDES. 
Contract with FGI subject 
to quota contributions and 
approval of the Credit 
Recovery Policy. 
Input control, from a structural perspective 
(Boehs e Segatto-Mendes, 2007). Better 
information exchange (Gulati and Sytch, 
2007), higher frequency of communication 
(Becerra e Gupta, 2003). 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on BNDES information. 
 
The fund has private nature, aimed at MSMEs 
and individuals (individual micro entrepreneurs and 
freight carriers), is not subject to budgetary constraints 
and has more flexible rules and processes, which are 
more agile and appropriate to the dynamics of its 
segment. 
BNDES acting as manager of FGI is consistent 
with its role as a NDB, helping to expand credit access 
with better conditions, considering both indirect 
operations (with BNDES resources) operated by the 
banks as financial agents and providing guarantee to 
financial agents own funded operation for investments, 
innovation and working capital. It fosters project 
development and scaling up, leveraging finance, 
reduces the cost of capital to the borrower, crowding-in 
private capital, and improving governance and 
inclusiveness. FGI setting tries to compensate for credit 
market failures, helping to improve Brazil 
competitiveness.  
 
Interviews 
 
The interviews analysis indicated that the FGI’s 
governance structure considered that international and 
national benchmark for guarantee schemes. 
BNDES has participated for several years in SME 
guarantees’ international forums, such as the Ibero-
American Forum of Guarantees. In addition, in the 
fund restructuring process, international experience 
was analyzed, with visits to OSEO (now BPI) in 
France, FNG in Colombia and Nafinsa in Mexico. 
 
We held a discussion group with Banco 
do Brasil, manager of FGO, and Sebrae, 
manager of Fampe, to discuss the 
evolution of guarantee funds for MSMEs 
in Brazil. The exchange of experiences 
on accounting provision, credit recovery 
and regulatory affairs has been very 
rich. 
... One of the discussions subjects with 
Banco do Brasil and Sebrae is the 
operation of the FGI as a second floor 
fund to work together with mutual 
guarantee associations, whose creation 
has been stimulated by Sebrae, based on 
the Italian experience. 
 
The Fund tried to correct the flaws identified in 
the FGPC, such as its public nature, which led to 
budget constraints and delays in payments and its rigid 
credit recovery rules. To repair banks’ trust in the 
guarantee, the governance initially emphasized the 
structural perspective, reinforcing trustworthy 
behavior, as proposed by Gillespie and Dietz’s (2009), 
since, despite its private legal nature, most of the 
fund’s assets were composed of public resources. This 
was accompanied by dissemination of information 
about the fund to possible operators and an attempt to 
start building a relationship with partner banks, in a 
perspective consistent with Faems et al. (2008) 
relational approach:  
 
Trust in the FGI has improved, 
especially because at the beginning the 
FGI was seen as potentially a new 
FGPC... But the FGI gradually gained 
credibility and its operation was quite 
different from the FGPC’s. Guarantee 
claims are always paid promptly…the 
banks’ requests for changes are being 
accepted more frequently ...because, as it 
is a private fund, the FGI’s rules can be 
altered more easily than if it were a 
public fund.  
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The FGI’s governance structure sought 
to correct the deficiencies identified in 
BNDES’s previous experience with 
guarantee funds. The FGI was structured 
as a private entity and is therefore not 
subject to budgetary constraints.   
 
As proposed by Lewicki and Bunker (1995), the 
interviewees show that FGI tries to behave consistently 
and predictably, broadening its relationships:  
 
I believe that they see us as being 
committed interlocutors but I also think 
that they realize that we won’t be able to 
do everything and I think we usually 
emphasize this point during our visits to 
banks. 
FGI...seek to meet the deadlines 
informed to the banks... 
...the direction of changes is clear to the 
banks... 
 
The FGI tried to build a reputation for 
credibility to repair trust, distinguish itself from the 
FGPC by. Following Tomlinson and Mayer’s (2009) 
proposals, decisions are justified and partners are told 
when they depend on external agents, in accordance 
with. 
 
In various cases, it is not possible to 
comply with banks’ requests due to legal 
restrictions or because they conflict with 
the guidelines adopted by the 
government which is the fund’s biggest 
investor.  In these cases, the reasons for 
the decision are communicated to the 
requesting party.   
Banks’ demands are assessed and 
prioritized. When these demands are 
made by more than one bank, they tend 
to be implemented. In some cases, they 
require approval by the general meeting 
of fund shareholders which congregates 
all the banks who participate in the FGI.  
 
As proposed by Becerra and Gupta (2003), 
managers explicitly recognize the role of the frequency 
of communication. Information sharing is used to 
create trust, with prior discussions of proposals for 
changes to rules. There is a concern to keep channels of 
communication that provide accurate, complete and 
timely information open, as proposed by Gulati and 
Sytch (2007). 
 
Since its creation the fund has always 
listened to the banks. […] Banks are 
informed in advance about changes to 
rules, systems and processes to enable 
them to adapt their internal systems, 
given that the FGI’s processes, 
especially after guarantee hiring, are IT 
intensive.   
The banks receive information regarding 
the value and performance of their 
shares in the fund on a monthly basis.   
Changes are discussed and banks are 
informed about them in advance.  
 
In line with the approach proposed by Zaheer et 
al (1998) and Malhotra and Murnighan (2002), a 
change was also identified in the nature of the rules 
governing contracts with banks, seeking to make them 
less binding and based more on cooperation between 
parties,  
 
I think that the application of rules used 
to be more rigid but has become more 
flexible... 
During the course of the operation the 
penalties laid down in the rules were 
attenuated and an adjustment of conduct 
provision was created to deal with cases 
where a financial agent has behaved in a 
way that is inappropriate or even 
contrary to some rule of the fund, but 
acted in good faith. These provisions 
stipulate that the agent must adjust his 
operation and may provide for some 
penalty, but this penalty is negotiated 
and is usually more lenient than the one 
foreseen by the general rule. 
 
I think that the fund’s contracts and rules 
used to have a negative effect on agents’ 
perceptions, but this has changed. Now 
every time we change the statute and the 
rules we try to simplify processes in 
order to align them with agents’ usual 
practices. I believe that agents’ trust in 
FGI is increasing day by day.  
 
The use of some mechanisms described by 
Boehs and Segatto-Mendes (2007) can be identified, 
such as standardization of operations with rules and 
procedures similar to those adopted by banks; 
socialization of values, through training programs and 
seminars; and personal involvement and a specific 
hierarchical structure, with the creation of an 
Institutional Relationship Department responsible for 
contacts and assessment of banks’ procedures: 
 
...The BNDES has sought to simplify 
processes to make them more compatible 
with banks’ business routines. 
... Procedures were examined together 
with the banks to identify any doubts they 
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might have regarding the fund guarantee 
application process. Various doubts were 
indeed identified, thus leading to 
improvements in rules and enabling 
banks to fix problems before submitting 
guarantee claims to the fund. 
We created a department that deals 
exclusively with the fund’s relationship 
with banks. It is responsible for 
capturing new banks as shareholders, 
organizing training programs and 
publicizing the fund.   
 
The interviews identified a low level of conflict 
and disputes between parties. Conflicts are mostly 
functional (Mesquita, 2007) and their solution often 
leads to improvements in performance, with 
collaboration prevailing over control and thus breaking 
the negative cycle identified by Sundarämurthy and 
Lewis (2003). 
 
In general, that have been very few 
conflicts and when they occur they are 
resolved in a friendly fashion. 
We have practically no conflicts with 
banks ...the treatment of cases outside 
the parameters or in which 
interpretations diverge have improved. 
The BNDES has made a greater effort to 
meet banks’ requests.  
[...] the level of conflict is low [...] when 
conflicts arise it is because a bank has 
not complied with a certain point of the 
rules and then a negotiation process 
begins. 
 
The main benefits from the fund mentioned by 
the management team confirm the guarantee schemes 
literature (Lanz, Tomei, 2014; Jonsson, 2009; Green, 
2003). 
 
The financial agent earns liquidity in the 
guarantee, which allows him to accept 
good transactions that he would not 
normally contract due to insufficient 
collateral. 
[...] The financial agent has the benefit 
of less need for capital allocation when 
using a guarantee fund. The effect is the 
same as a mortgage, but the execution of 
the guarantee is much faster. 
[...] Qualified agents can offer financing 
to more customers, increase credit limits 
and can gain market share with the 
fund's guarantee. 
The clients of the fund are the financial 
agents, they have to “buy the idea” of 
the fund and see value in the guarantee 
offered.  
The benefit to MSME is access to credit. 
[…] the share of firms and individuals 
who had never had access to the 
BNDES’s credit lines, is over 50% of 
total beneficiaries, which shows that the 
fund is achieving its aim of increasing 
credit access. 
 
The managers provided some examples of the 
effects of the governance structure on FGI’s 
performance, highlighting qualitative aspects, that can 
be linked to trust building and long-term relationship 
perspective (Faems et al, 2008): 
 
The fund’s performance has improved 
significantly in qualitative terms… [...] 
in regional terms, the North and 
Northeast regions’ share in the fund’s 
operations is higher than the BNDES’s 
overall average, showing that the fund is 
helping to de-concentrate operations to 
Brazil’s less developed regions. 
[...] The fund [...] has been successful in 
convincing a great number of banks to 
become shareholders. FGI is the 
guarantee fund with the greatest number 
of financial agents in Brazil. 
[...] FGI currently have 26 financial 
agents as shareholders [...] 
The Fund’s market share in eligible 
operations for the fund’s guarantee 
passed the international benchmark of 
10% for this type of instrument.   
 
Analyzing the interviews content is possible to 
identify that the changes in FGI’s governance structure 
compared to FGPC’s supported the trust repair process 
and improved the fund’s overall performance. 
 
Operational Results 
 
The aim of this subsection is to present the 
operational data of the FGI and compare them with 
similar operations or the international benchmark when 
applicable.  
The percentage of financing with FGI 
guarantees in relation to the total number of eligible 
operations up to December of 2016 is 5.5%. Despite 
this, it passes the 10% mark in seven banks and 50% of 
the operations in another two. The rate of applications 
is 3.10% (December 2016), which is lower than the 
default rate of the financial system, which was 8% for 
the same period (BCB, 2017).  
The new borrower results (Table 6) confirms the 
interviewees’ perception regarding wider access to 
credit. Almost 50% of the borrowers had never 
accessed BNDES credit, more than double the average 
operations without guarantee during the same period, 
which is confirms FGI financial additionality, in 
accordance with Jonsson (2009).  
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Table 6 - Financial Additionality – New borrowers 
 
 Without Guarantee With Guarantee 
New 
borrower 
Value R$ 
Millions 
Value 
(%) 
Nº OPE 
(#) 
Nº OPE 
(%) 
Value R$ 
Millions 
Value 
(%) 
Nº OPE 
(#) 
Nº OPE 
(%) 
No 96.782 83,1% 442.968 79,4% 3.205 55,8% 15.667 50,1% 
Yes 19.745 16,9% 115.171 20,6% 2.543 44,2% 15.589 49,9% 
Total 116.527 100,0% 558.139 100,0% 5.748 100,0% 31.256 100,0% 
 
Source: BNDES. Operations up to 31/12/2016. 
 
The operations risk comparison shows that the 
fund enables SMEs with greater risk to access BNDES’ 
credit, as showed by Table 7. This credit has the lowest 
rates on the market for this segment. Risk C represents 
39.6% of FGI operations, which is almost double the 
operations without guarantee, in which only 21.4% are 
risk level C or lower. The indicator shows that 
companies enjoy better credit access conditions, in 
accordance with the expectations of Jonsson (2009). 
 
Table 7 - Risk attributed by the financial agent 
 
 Without Guarantee With Guarantee 
Risk1 Value (%) Nº OPE (%) 
Value R$ 
Millions 
Value (%) Nº OPE (#) Nº OPE (%) 
AA 47,3% 28,4% 1.062 18,5% 5.375 17,2% 
A 20,9% 20,8% 1.296 22,6% 7.095 22,7% 
B 22,2% 29,4% 1.341 23,3% 6.408 20,5% 
C 4,0% 12,7% 2.048 35,6% 12.378 39,6% 
D-H 5,6% 8,7% 
    
Total 100,0% 100,0% 5.748 100,0% 31.256 100,0% 
  
Source: BNDES – Operations up to 31/12/2016. Resolution 2682/99 (BCB) 
 
The FGI guarantees operations in all Brazilian 
states, as showed by the map in Figure 1 (the 
distribution of operations by municipality). The fund 
has a larger share in the North and Northeast than the 
other operations of the BNDES. This demonstrates the 
economic and social additionality of the FGI, as these 
are the least developed states in Brazil. 
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Figure 1 - Distribution of Operations by Municipality 
 
Source: BNDES. Operations engaged up to 31/12/2016. 
 
Operations with FGI have higher average values 
for all companies’ size analyzed, (Microentreprenuers, 
microenterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises), 
which is consistent with financial additionality effect, 
as showed by the graph in Figure 2. The medium 
average guarantee percentage diminishes according to 
the size of the company, since smaller companies have 
more difficulties to provide collateral to the banks. 
 
Figure 2 - Average financed value by firm size with and without FGI coverage 
Source: BNDES. Operations up to 31/12/2016. 
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Operations with FGI have higher term for two 
firm sizes, micro and medium, showing a mixed result, 
that does not fully confirm the expected results, as 
showed by Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 - Average term (in months) by firm size with and without FGI coverage 
 
Source: BNDES. Operations up to 31/12/2016. 
 
The results indicated that the FGI is fulfilling its 
mission to provide credit access to MSMEs. However, 
further analysis is need to isolate other possible effects 
and assure that the results are statically consistent. 
Other techniques besides descriptive statistics should 
be employed, like Propensity score matching, 
Regression discontinuity, Natural and quasi-natural 
experiment or Randomized experiment. 
 
 
5 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND FINAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
 
The article analyzed the process of building 
trust in a guarantee fund – the FGI in a challenging 
institutional environment. Lack of credit access can be 
related to at least three pillars of the Global 
Competitiveness Index were Brazil does not perform 
well: Institutions, Macroeconomic Environment and 
Financial market development. Therefore, the process 
had to take this environment into account and involved 
repairing trust in its relationship with banks, which had 
been shaken by the failure of a previous initiative 
involving the FGPC. The analysis focused on 
comparing FGI with CGS for microentrepreneurs and 
SMEs around the world and tried to identify best 
practices, suitable governance structures and evaluate 
its effects on credit access and financial, economic and 
social additionality. The analysis of the interviews 
revealed that managers were committed to building a 
relationship of trust with the banks, with the BNDES’s 
previous experience providing some interesting 
elements to help avoid repeating mistakes.   
The use of BNDES, a NDB to manage the 
guarantee fund is also consistent with international 
practices and its role in developing financial markets 
and promote long term investment. The fund was 
structured as a private entity. The governance structure 
including the financial agents seeks to align interests, 
as proposed by Handley and Benton (2013). The fund 
pay claims on first demand and credit recovery is 
delegated to financial agents. These measures are due 
to the long term required by the Brazilian judicial 
system to recover credits, identified by WEF GDI and 
mentioned on the interviews.  
The results showed that to build and repair trust 
and obtain a better performance it is necessary to find a 
balance between structural safety mechanisms that 
limit untrustworthy behavior, as analyzed by Gillespie 
and Dietz (2009) and Faems et al. (2008), using the 
mechanisms suggested by Boehs and Segatto-Mendes 
(2007), and a relational approach which reinforces 
trustworthy and predictable behavior (Lewicki and 
Bunker 1995). The latter uses non-binding contracts, as 
proposed by Malhotra and Murnighan (2002) and 
establishes information communication and exchange 
mechanisms (Gulati, Sytch 2007; Becerra, Gupta 2003) 
and joint work on tasks, while restricting conflicts to 
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business-related issues (Mesquita, 2007; Tomlinson, 
Mayer, 2009), in a long-term perspective with common 
objectives that reinforce inter-organizational trust. 
These perspectives are complementary and can 
contribute to the success of inter-organizational 
alliances, in which collaboration - as put forward by 
Sundarämurthy and Lewis (2003) - prevails.  
The operational results analysis showed that 
FGI promote credit access (almost 50% of the 
beneficiaries were new borrowers), regional de-
concentration (North and Northeast have a greater 
share compared to loans without guarantee), accept 
more riskier takers, have financial additionality (higher 
values and more term to pay) and significant 
participation in eligible operations. 
Furthermore, the fund monitored and identified 
the main benefits for the parties involved, including the 
guarantor, the banks and the beneficiaries, using these 
in their communications to make their use more 
widespread.   
Some recommendations for future studies 
include extending the study to include other guarantee 
mechanisms, such as mutual credit guarantee 
associations and guarantee funds for other risks, in 
addition to credit risks, such as performance, 
engineering and failure to comply with contractual 
obligations.   
The trust building and repair process can be 
applied to other types of inter-organizational 
relationships, such as those between suppliers and 
buyers, joint ventures and capital and contractual 
alliances, seeking to use an appropriate mix of 
structural and relational governance mechanisms. 
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